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The United Nations at Fifty:
A Reform Agenda
Janice Gross Stein
[L]et us be frank with each other, and with the peoples of the
United Nations. We have not yet achieved the sweeping and
fundamental reform that I and many others believe is required.
Sharp differences, some of them substantive and legitimate, have
played their part in preventing that.1
Secretary-General Kofi Annan

I. Introduction

T

he United Nations has just gone through a very unhappy birthday year. Its sixtieth birthday was supposed to be a year of reform,
renewal, and regeneration. Secretary-General Kofi Annan launched the
reform process, fully aware that the credibility of the U.N. was at stake.
Two years before its birthday, in 2003, the Security Council was marginalized when the United States and its allies went around the deadlocked Council to go to war against Iraq. A serious and damaging story
of U.N. mismanagement of the important Oil-for-Food program in Iraq
came to light in 2004, and the Volcker Commission that investigated it
reached into the Secretary-General’s office when it assigned responsibility. The run-up year to the birthday party can best be described—in
the words of the Secretary-General—as an annus horribilis. The legitimacy of the United Nations, its capacity, and its relevance, were all at
issue.
Partly in response to these very difficult years, but also in recognition of deep structural changes in the post-Cold War global order,
the Secretary-General commissioned a series of high-level panels and
reports to advise him on a process of reform that would better equip
the United Nations to face the challenges of the twenty-first century.
The world in which the United Nations was created in 1945—one
of all-encompassing war among states and formal empires—was no
more. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union,
the long frozen stalemate through the heart of Europe and proxy wars
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worldwide, ended forty years later. The post-Cold War euphoria and
the hope that a newly invigorated U.N. would finally be free to fulfill
its founders’ hopes dissipated in the killing fields of Rwanda and the
Balkans. The early years of the twenty-first century, especially after
September 11th in New York, were like a splash of cold water, inviting
a sober reappraisal of security and sovereignty.
The first high-level panel, appointed to examine the growing importance of civil society and non-governmental organizations to the work
of the U.N., released its report in 2004. The second high-level panel
was asked to examine the challenges to collective security, the core of
the United Nations’ mandate. In its report, released in the autumn of
2004, it looked first at the prevention of threats to collective security,
then at the conditions that shape the use of force, and, finally, at the
institutional reforms necessary to equip the U.N. to deal with the new
challenges. A third appointed panel published its commissioned report
in January 2005 on the responsibilities of the United Nations in meeting the challenges of development.2
The three reports provided a rich source of analysis and commentary that informed the thinking of the Secretary-General as he
prepared for the special summit of world leaders on the sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations. In his response, the Secretary-General
knit together the fundamental values and commitments that would
inform a reinvigorated United Nations. He defined the interconnected
challenges as development, security, and human rights—freedom from
want, freedom from fear, and freedom to live in dignity.3 Annan issued
a series of challenges, requiring specific decisions, to the 154 heads of
state and government that came to New York for the World Summit,
held September 14–16, 2005.
The year of reform has now passed. How well did members of the
United Nations do in meeting the challenges outlined by the Secretary-General? The short answer is that the glass is half full. We can
argue about whether the glass is half empty or at least half full, as
the Secretary-General concluded after the summit.4 To explain why I
reached the judgment that the glass is at best half full, I begin by looking at the conceptual innovation the three reports provide to frame
contemporary challenges in security, development, and human rights.
What kind of world order, if any, do we have? Is the U.N. protecting a
global order that is structured and legitimate, or is it an important part
of restructuring a global system that is fragmented and contested? The
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answer to this question matters in creating reasonable expectations of
what the U.N. can and cannot do.
As I consider the three broad normative categories of freedom from
want, freedom from fear, and freedom to live in dignity, I look at particular clusters of challenges that speak to each of these normative concerns and constitute the core of the reform agenda. I stay away from
the thorny issue of Security Council reform, a perennial issue, which
has resisted solution for decades and, for that reason, seems an unfair
test of the adaptability of the United Nations.
• In considering the freedom from want, I assess how well the U.N.
has done in putting in place a global partnership for development,
in moving toward goals of debt reduction, in setting standards for
development assistance, and in putting in place the coalitions and
machinery that will enable progress toward the Millennium Development Goals.
• In considering the freedom from fear, I look at changes in the conception of sovereignty and their consequences for peace and security. Has the U.N. been able to develop the capacity to respond to
threats to human security that challenge deeply embedded concepts
of state sovereignty? Has the U.N. moved forward on the basket
of issues that we call peace building and post-conflict reconstruction? Is the U.N. better equipped to address the security challenges
that are likely to emerge when states are only one of many players,
military technologies are being miniaturized, and militias are armed
with technologies that cross borders?
• In considering the freedom to live in dignity, I look at how far the
U.N. has moved on making human rights a meaningful and important component of its institutional machinery. Has it been able to
build in an element of accountability, so that states that routinely
and massively violate human rights are no longer represented in
key institutions?
• Finally, I look at the important, if unglamorous, issue of management reform. Without improvement to its capacity to manage, the
U.N. will be unable to deliver better performance. In this birthday
year, have some of the glaring deficiencies in management processes that hobble the United Nations been corrected?
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This kind of assessment should permit a balanced scorecard, an
evaluation of how far the U.N. has come in the last year, and how well
equipped it is to face the big challenges of the decade ahead. Is the
U.N. likely to be one of the core institutional building blocks of global
security, or is it likely to fade into voluble obscurity, a place to stop and
talk, but not much more?
One caveat: It is paradoxical that defenders of the U.N. routinely
attack the convenient fiction that there is a United Nations. There is no
United Nations, they insist, but rather a collection of governments that
come together in the General Assembly, in the Security Council, in the
Human Rights Council. The U.N. is “us,” the member states. When the
U.N. fails to act, to manage, to reform, it is not the U.N. that is failing,
its proponents claim, but its members. It is “we” who are failing. It is,
by extension, unfair to hold this abstraction we call the United Nations
accountable for our failings.
This argument strikes me as disingenuous. If the argument is that
intergovernmental bodies with broad mandates are crippled ab initio,
that they are by nature suboptimal performers, then we need to take
the argument seriously indeed and look creatively to other kinds of
institutions to meet the challenges of global security. This is an argument that many admirers of the U.N. resist, and resist strongly.
Alternatively, one can argue there are many bodies that are intergovernmental and there are many institutions that have both very difficult stakeholder communities and principal-agent relationships. The
U.N. is unique in the extraordinarily broad scope of its membership
and its mandate, but not in its intergovernmental composition or its
stakeholders. Its challenges differ in degree but not in kind.
A more fruitful way of conceiving the United Nations is not as a single institution but as at least three: an intergovernmental organization
of states that constitute its core membership; the secretariat that staffs,
manages, and leads the work of the intergovernmental organization;
and the communities of experts and non-governmental organizations
that work closely with the first two.5 It is up to the leadership of all
three United Nations to navigate the shoals of governments as members and to manage through to better outcomes. Although the responsibilities and the performance of all three are closely intertwined, it is
possible to develop reasonable expectations of each in their respective
areas of responsibility. The mandate of the U.N. makes it too important
to have no expectations whatsoever because it is an intergovernmental
institution.
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II. The Freedom from Want
Perhaps the best place to dissect the emergent architecture in which
the United Nations lives is the report the Secretary-General prepared
to inform the debate of the special session of the General Assembly
in 2005. Much of what Kofi Annan tells us about development would
be familiar to students of global politics reading a similar document
twenty or thirty years ago, but some would not. What is also new is the
dense interconnections that he draws across his reform agenda.
The Secretary-General begins with the most basic: freedom from
want, the fundamental right of people to live free from hunger and
with drinkable water, decent shelter, and freedom from preventable
disease. These basic economic and social rights have been recognized
for decades as fundamental, but the report treats them as bedrock,
as foundational. The report moves beyond these foundational rights,
however, to connect them to a bigger basket of rights. “In larger freedom,” the Secretary-General writes, “encapsulates the idea that development, security, and human rights go hand in hand… . Not only
are development, security, and human rights all imperative; they also
reinforce each other.”6 This phrase merits attention. It captures fragments of the new paradigm that the Secretary-General uses to frame
the global environment of the United Nations.
First, development is justified not only for its own sake, but also as
the critical underpinning of global security. Poverty (which kills 20,000
people every day), disease, inequality, displaced people that number
approximately 25 million (nearly one-third of whom cannot be reached
by the U.N.), and permanent communities of refugees all degrade the
human and social condition. They simultaneously create the preconditions for the militarization of states and for the “militiazation” of
politics by aggrieved young people who see no hope and no future.
Threats to world peace and security, at the core of the mandate of the
United Nations, are no longer restricted to territorial disputes among
sovereign states. They take many forms but they all grow and thrive in
an ecology of scarcity.
The focus of the United Nations is on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, agreed to in 2000, elaborated in Monterrey in 2002, and targeted by 2015.7 Jeffrey Sachs, in his commissioned
report, urged the U.N. to promote a number of “quick wins” to create
momentum and also to dispel widespread donor fatigue and cynicism
that development assistance can be effectively used and actually con-
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tribute to development. In his response, the Secretary-General urged
developing states to recommit themselves to increasing development
assistance to 0.7% of their budgets—a longstanding target—in order to
better help countries with honest, committed governments to escape
“poverty traps.” In language that would not have been familiar twenty
years ago, however, he also urged developing countries to take “primary responsibility” for their own development by “strengthening
governance, combating corruption, and putting in place the policies
and instruments to drive private-sector-led growth and maximize
domestic resources to fund national development strategies.”8
The Secretary-General’s report reflects the new forces that are shaping the environment of the U.N. and redefining the challenges. A second core element of the new paradigm of development is that states
and international institutions are no longer the only or, at times, the
primary actors in development. Although part of the new paradigm is
certainly an emphasis on the responsibilities of the developed world,
there is also an emphasis on the responsibilities of developing countries, on their nationally developed and “owned” strategies to reduce
poverty. Less expected is the attention given to strengthening the role
of the private sector, and to the role of civil society.9 The leadership
of the U.N. no longer sees development exclusively as a state-based
responsibility, but as a partnership among international institutions,
the private sector, global and local civil society, and the developed and
the developing world. In this complex and closely connected environment, the U.N. emerges as one among several nodes with a special
responsibility to enable and facilitate development.
A. Progress on Development
How much progress has been made on development? Over half the
final outcome document of the World Summit deals with development, an indication of its central importance to the vast majority of
members of the General Assembly. But how much new ground was
broken? Very little. The United States, unenthusiastic originally about
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), did agree to accept them
as the frame of reference for ongoing work in development. Yet it is
already transparently clear that most of the Millennium goals will not
be met, and that, in some cases, the gap is widening. To be fair, expectations were set very high and the United Nations has played a key
role in setting the norms that shaped these expectations.10
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More to the point, the World Summit affirmed work that had
already been done, without pushing the agenda much further. Under
the leadership of the Secretary-General, leaders knit together the new
players in international development in a much more comprehensive
way. Nevertheless, progress on the core building blocks has been very
limited, even in the months following the special session of the General
Assembly. The World Summit did push forward some very general
proposals for financing development, even though no new major commitments were made.
The Secretary-General, as we have seen, asked member states to
recognize the global partnership for development, with an interlocking
set of roles and responsibilities. This the World Summit did, paying
special attention to the responsibility of states receiving development
assistance to enact good governance and mobilize domestic resources.
In return, the final document speaks of a graduated increase in development assistance, with specific deadlines. However, these deadlines
had been largely agreed to by the European Union before the Summit.
The final document also speaks of innovative financing instruments: an
International Finance Facility and a levy on airline travel, an idea proposed over a decade ago. No binding commitments were made at the
Summit. Progress on both these issues took place among a “coalition of
the willing” around the edges. The Summit did not put global capital
markets and the international financial institutions on its agenda. At
most, we can argue that the World Summit was a spur to activity by
other institutions outside the U.N. family.
Members were also asked to accomplish a focused set of objectives.11
The rate of progress tells us something important about the complexity
of the development environment, and about the challenging role of the
U.N. as enabler.
• There has been some limited progress on debt reduction, largely
as a result of civil society working through the Group of Eight. The
G-8 proposed in 2005 to cancel 100 percent of the outstanding debt
that the eighteen most heavily indebted poor countries owed to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Development
Association (IDA), and the African Development Bank (ADB)—a
nominal value of $40 billion over 40 years, or a savings of $1 billion
annually for all the 18 countries. They will still have to pay their
debt to other multilateral creditors. Moreover, the IDA and the ADB
will be reducing gross aid payments to each of these countries by
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the amount of debt cancelled, and redistribute the funding among
all IDA and ADB lenders within the category. This means that these
eighteen most heavily indebted countries will benefit much less
from the reduction of their debt. The G-8 also agreed to provide
additional resources to the three lenders so that their financing
capacity is not reduced by the cancellation of the debt payment.
Much of this work took place outside formal U.N. machinery. The
World Summit meeting did recommend cancellation of 100 percent
of the official multilateral and bilateral debt of twenty other heavily indebted poor countries.12 Beyond the most heavily indebted, the
Summit spoke only in the vaguest of generalities: relief would be on a
case-by-case basis, based largely on the sustainability of the individual
debt. There was no progress on the long-demanded redefinition of
what constitutes a sustainable debt. This kind of commitment does not
provide much of a road map forward on responsible debt forgiveness.
• The Doha Round of multilateral negotiations, managed within the
World Trade Organization, remains deadlocked over the contentious issue of agricultural subsidies in developed countries, which
effectively block agricultural exports from developing countries.
• Some of the “quick win” initiatives suggested have been led by
private foundations, notably the Gates Foundation, and by nongovernmental organizations. Progress has been greatest in public
health, but it has been made largely outside the World Health Organization and UNAIDS. This kind of pattern is likely to grow in
importance over time.
On the fringe of the Summit, the “Lula Group” (Brazil, France, Chile,
Spain, Germany, and Algeria) proposed the introduction of a solidarity contribution on airline tickets.13 The proceeds would go in part to
refinance the International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm),
which was created just before the World Summit by Britain, Spain,
Italy, Sweden, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. They expect
the IFFIm to help raise $4 billion in international capital markets over
the next decade to support the work of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI). The British hope to demonstrate the
possibility of raising development assistance through capital markets.
Although the concept of development aid on credit garnered little
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support in the final document of the World Summit, the first proceeds
from the tax on air travel have begun to flow to IFFIm.14
• On increasing development assistance, the World Summit codified
what individual and groups of countries had already agreed to do.
In June 2005, for example, the EU agreed to increase ODA to an EU
average of 0.56% of GDP by 2010 and to 0.7% by 2015.
How do we assess the role of the United Nations on a set of issues
that the Secretary-General has identified as critically connected to the
foundational mandate of the organization? The Secretary-General
played an important role in setting norms, defining expectations, and
drawing out key decisions and markers that should be met. His was
the “bully pulpit,” a not inconsiderable role and responsibility. That
bully pulpit was effective in stimulating governments and non-governmental organizations to make new commitments and launch new
initiatives in preparation for the World Summit. Even though decision making was situated in multiple sites—a few within the United
Nations but many outside of its formal structure, even its extended
structure—the Secretary-General set the table, focused attention on
development, and prodded others to action. The U.N. is today only
one node, an important node but still only one, in a complex network
of institutions, states, civil society organizations, and private sector
firms that shape development. Nevertheless, it has special responsibilities in enabling and pushing the development agenda forward. Even
though the U.N. is unlikely to be the driver of the development agenda
in the next decade, it can and should be its enabler.
III. The Freedom from Fear
Perhaps the most sweeping changes to the traditional framing of the
mandate of the United Nations have taken place on the issues of peace
and security. It is these issues which are at the core of the Charter and
constitute the principal preoccupation of the United Nations. These
issues engage the most central institutions of the United Nations, the
Security Council and the General Assembly. And yet, as the SecretaryGeneral noted, “While, in the development sphere, we suffer from
weak implementation, on the security side, despite a heightened sense
of threat among many we lack even a basic consensus and implementation, where it occurs, is all too often contested.”15 The diagnosis
is apt. The report goes further: “These are not theoretical issues but
11
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issues of deadly urgency,” the Secretary-General writes. “If we do not
reach a consensus on them this year and start to act on it, we may not
have another chance.”16 It is this urgent warning that inspired the title
of my original paper: “The United Nations is late, very late, for a very
important date.”
This sense of urgency underlies three significant changes to the
traditional concept of threats to peace and security that is embedded
in the U.N. Charter and has informed the work of the U.N., particularly the Security Council. These three seminal changes are the explicit
recognition of the shortness of time, the interconnectedness among
threats, and the radical revision of the concept of sovereignty. All three
have profound consequences for what the United Nations takes on and
for the way the Security Council does its work.
A. The Shortness of Time
The global security environment, like other global environments, has
changed significantly in the last several decades. The time to make
decisions is much shorter than it used to be, making the world far
more dangerous and accident-prone than before. Technology and politics together have created a set of threats that allows very little time
for deliberation before a response. The shortness of time first became a
recognized security issue when nuclear weapons entered the arsenals
of the major powers. Yet their conceptual and practical consequences
were limited, perhaps unfairly, because it was the large established
states with strong established machineries of command and control
that had a monopoly on nuclear weapons. As miniaturization developed and unit costs went down, increasingly destructive technologies
with the capacity to reach farther and farther across borders proliferated. Response times shortened. Add to the brevity of time the privatization of the arms trade, including nuclear arms, and the dual use of
civilian technologies, and the time for Security Council deliberation on
an urgent threat shrinks.
It is within this shrinking window for Security Council action that
the Secretary-General asked U.N. members to consider when and how
it was appropriate to consider “the early authorization of coercive
measures.”17 The high-level panel responded that the Security Council,
but only the Security Council, may authorize preventive war against
an attack that was apparently or immediately imminent. However,
individual states may not invoke a right to prevention under the clause
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of the Charter, Article 51, which authorizes the use of force in selfdefense. The panel ruled out unilateral prevention as legitimate under
the Charter, even as it moved to fundamentally change the concept of
state sovereignty that was the foundation of the United Nations.
The Secretary-General also invoked the shortness of time for decisions, the corresponding sense of urgency to identify the interconnectedness of threats, and a changing concept of sovereignty as major
challenges to global security.
B. The Interconnectedness of Threats
The deepening of complex linkages around the world in the last thirty
years, which we summarize conveniently with the term “globalization,” has also connected the consequences of breaches of security
much more tightly. The consequences of a nuclear attack in the Middle
East, for example, would spread worldwide. Indeed, the costs and consequences of the attacks on New York and Washington on September
11, 2001, attacks carried out with commercial airplanes, have cost in
the billions of dollars and have rippled around the globe. The Secretary-General identified not only international war and conflict, but
civil violence, organized crime, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, poverty, deadly infectious disease, and environmental degradation as interconnected in the basket of threats to peace and security.
The occurrence of one exacerbates many of the others and heightens
global security challenges.
IV. Sovereignty as Responsibility
The Secretary-General also drew on the bitter failure of the United
Nations in Rwanda to engage directly with the meaning of sovereignty,
when security no longer means only state security but human security.
In his analysis of the growing crises of the internally displaced, Francis
Deng pioneered a concept of sovereignty not only as a right but also as
a responsibility.18 The International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (ICISS), an independent panel created by Canada
which worked closely with the Secretary-General, extended the concept of sovereignty as responsibility in its 2001 report, The Responsibility to Protect.19 The Commission noted the gap in the mandate of
international institutions to deal with governments that turned against
their own citizens, engaged in widespread and systematic abuse, and
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created massive human suffering. International institutions, the commissioners observed, have no mandate to intervene to stop this kind
of suffering. The responsibility to protect, the report argued, is an
emerging principle of customary international law supported both by
a range of legal sources and by state practice.20
The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change underlined and extended the principle of the responsibility to protect in its
report. It insisted that all signatories to the U.N. Charter accept not
only their obligations to their fellow members, as the conventional
understanding of collective security suggests, but also a responsibility to protect their own citizens.21 Sovereignty is contingent, then, as
much on internal as on external behavior. This concept of sovereignty
changes the foundation of the post-Westphalian order, which had governed states for the last three-and-a-half centuries. Sovereignty is no
longer defined exclusively as autonomy and can no longer be invoked
to shield a government’s failure to protect its own citizens from the
interference of others. On the contrary, states are obligated to come
to the assistance of citizens who are being systematically harmed or
abused by their own governments.
The panel was careful to specify the kinds of actions that obligate
member states to exercise their responsibility to protect the citizens
of other states. These include genocide and other large-scale killing,
ethnic cleansing, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, actions that are at the highest end of the conflict spectrum
and the most severe abuses of human rights. Here the panel joins
human rights with global security, and extends the meaning of security
beyond states to individuals, to groups, and to citizens. The SecretaryGeneral affirmed all of these conceptual changes and more. He asked
explicitly that heads of government make the decision at the special
60th-anniversary session of the General Assembly to affirm “the right
of the Security Council to use military force, including preventively, to
preserve international peace and security, including in cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other such crimes against humanity.”
A. Progress on Sovereignty as Responsibility
On the issue of sovereignty as responsibility, the Secretary-General
achieved an extraordinary success. The change to the meaning of sovereignty was highly controversial. For many within the developing world
contending with colonial histories and memories, this language was a
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thinly veiled disguise of a new imperialism, an imperialism which
wrapped itself in international law to justify the forcible intervention
by the North against the South. Only hard and persistent work by the
Secretary-General and like-minded states allayed some of these fears.
Pushed forward by Canada, 162 world leaders unanimously accepted
the principle of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), a responsibility
which is engaged when populations are at risk of genocide, ethnic
cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. In April 2006, the
Security Council reaffirmed the principle in Resolution 1674. The passage of these resolutions constitutes the most sweeping changes to legal
concepts of sovereignty in modern times, and extends the protection of
international humanitarian law inside states. From the introduction of
the concept by ICISS to its codification by the General Assembly and
the Security Council, it was only a matter of some five years.
The practice, not surprisingly, has fallen short of the normative
standard. The Security Council was famously and shamefully inactive during the genocide in Rwanda. It was deadlocked during the
ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. It was these failures to act that led to
the creation of the ICISS and to the revision of customary international
law. Yet when large-scale massacres of civilians and the displacement
of millions of people occurred in Darfur, it took the Security Council
almost eighteen months to pass a resolution condemning the killings.
At no point has the Security Council threatened to use military force,
after the fact, to enforce the responsibility to protect. So, although law
and norms may have changed, the Security Council through acts of
omission stands in violation of the changes to law and norms that it
has promulgated.
V. Progress on Arms Control and Disarmament
What about the other decisions the Secretary-General asked leaders to
make at the World Summit? Here the record is far less encouraging.
Most obvious was the failure to make even rhetorical progress on the
control of weapons of mass destruction. The World Summit took place
only a few months after the disappointing failure of the review conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty to come to agreement. The Secretary-General had asked world leaders to come into compliance with
existing treaties on non-proliferation, biological weapons, and chemical weapons conventions. Particularly pressing—and long outstanding—was the need for progress on a fissile material cut-off treaty and a
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moratorium on nuclear test explosions, which has lapsed. The ongoing
crises with North Korea and Iran, the leading threshold nuclear states,
made progress on nuclear arms control by the nuclear powers imperative, if states are to be dissuaded from breaking out of existing treaties
that restrain the development of nuclear weapons.
There was no substantive forward movement during or after the
World Summit. The lack of progress is not surprising, given the
longstanding refusal of some of the major nuclear powers to accept
additional restraints. It is nevertheless deeply discouraging that an
assembly of world leaders, celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the
United Nations, was unable even to agree on appropriate language
on nuclear arms control and disarmament to insert into the outcome
document of the summit. Clearly disappointed, Kofi Annan called the
failure to include a section on reducing the threat from weapons of
mass destruction a “disgrace.” This comes at a time when the existing
fabric of non-proliferation appears to be shredding. It is clear that the
General Assembly of the United Nations is no longer able even to give
voice to its formal responsibilities on arms control and disarmament.
VI. Progress on Terrorism
A second issue to which the Secretary-General gave great weight was
an unequivocal condemnation of terrorism. The High-Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges, and Change had broken new ground in its recommendations on terrorism. The panel dismissed the conventional bromide that one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter. It
rejected outright any targeting of civilians, intentional or unintentional,
for any political purpose, and it proposed a clear, if controversial, definition of terrorism. It defined terrorism as “any action…intended to
cause death or serious bodily harm to non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do
or to abstain from doing any act.”22
The language of the Secretary-General’s charge to the World Summit was even stronger than that of the high-level panel. The moral
authority of the United Nations, he insisted, had been compromised
by the inability of members to agree on a definition of terrorism. He
urged the assembled leaders to:
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…affirm that no cause or grievance, no matter how legitimate, justifies
the targeting and deliberate killing of civilians and non-combatants; and
declare that any action that is intended to cause death or serious bodily
harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act,
by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing
any act, constitutes an act of terrorism.23

He asked as well that world leaders agree to implement a comprehensive U.N. counter-terrorism strategy to dissuade people from resorting
to terrorism or supporting it, to deny terrorists access to funds and
materials, to deter states from supporting terrorism, and to develop
state capacity to defeat terrorism and defend human rights. The Secretary-General asked specifically that leaders conclude a convention
on nuclear terrorism “as a matter of urgency” and a comprehensive
convention on terrorism before the end of the sixtieth session of the
General Assembly.24
The urgent tone of the Secretary-General’s language is not surprising. Agreement on a definition and action on terrorism was important
conceptually and practically to the reform of the United Nations. The
new emphasis on human security, he insisted, dictates that, “the dignity, justice, worth, and safety” of every citizen be at the heart of a
twenty-first century system of collective security.25 The conceptual shift
to human security as the foundation of collective security is inconsistent with the targeting of civilians, no matter what the reason. It is also,
as the Secretary-General made clear, part of the seamless integration of
human rights with security and development; and terrorism is a fundamental violation of human rights. Finally, in the wake of September
11th, global attention to terrorism has increased. Measures to constrain
terrorism, along with an unequivocal rejection of any action that targets civilians, is part of the grand bargain of the reform of international
organizations. Without forward movement on terrorism, Great Power
engagement—especially on the part of the United States—on development and collective security was unlikely. To some degree, progress
on dealing with terrorism, promoting development, and enhancing
human rights were the exposed nerves of the reform movement.
How did the World Summit deal with terrorism, conceptually
and practically? Here too, the record is mixed. World leaders could
not agree on a definition of terrorism. Consequently, no definition is
included in the outcome document. They did agree to try again at the
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next meeting of the General Assembly. The Summit did condemn terrorism, without specifying precisely what constitutes terrorism and
“welcomed” the Secretary-General’s identification of elements of a
counter-terrorism strategy. The debate about the meaning of terrorism
simmered just below the surface of the Summit’s deliberations: states
must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with
their obligations under international law, in particular human rights
law, refugee law, and international humanitarian law. The strongest
action by the World Summit was clear support for the early entry into
effect of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism.
The Secretary-General followed up with recommendations for a
global counter-terrorism strategy in his report to the General Assembly
in April 2006.26 He urged members to dissuade, deny, and deter terrorists; to build state capacity to deal with terrorism; and to defend human
rights even while they struggled against terrorism. In his report, Kofi
Annan again unequivocally condemned terrorism, no matter what
cause its perpetrators claim to serve, and urged member states to conclude a comprehensive convention on terrorism.
What is the scorecard of the United Nations on terrorism? Certainly,
the Secretary-General did not succeed in persuading world leaders to
speak with clarity on the meaning of terrorism. There was no unequivocal rejection of the targeting of civilians under any circumstances; no
agreement on the illegitimacy of the violation of the rights of non-combatants. Leaders did move, however, on nuclear terrorism, a peril that
all could recognize. It is difficult to conclude that significant progress
was made, especially given the high priority the Secretary-General
attached to this issue. One of the principal fault lines of twenty-firstcentury conflict, a fault line that goes to the heart of human security,
remains exposed and contested.
VII. Progress on Peace Building
A third big issue in the Secretary-General’s report on security was
peace building. Despite the massive investment by the United Nations
over the last decade and a half in conflict prevention, peacekeeping,
and peace building, the record of sustained success has been discouraging. Approximately half of those societies that emerge from war
and civil conflict relapse back into violence within five years.27 Senior
leadership at the U.N. recognizes that while the problems in societies
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that undergo prolonged civil war are deeply-rooted and challenging,
resources could be better managed within the United Nations so that
peace building becomes more effective and robust.28
The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change strongly
recommended the creation of a Peace-Building Commission to identify
countries that are under stress and at risk of collapse. The Commission’s mandate should be to lead and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peace building over “whatever
period may be necessary.”29 In partnership with the national government, the Commission should organize proactive assistance and plan
for the transition between conflict and post-conflict peace building.
The subtext of the panel was not difficult to read. The U.N. needed
far better integration of its policy instruments and resources, and the
capacity to coherently sustain its efforts over the lengthy periods of
time that may be necessary to support a society struggling with the
transition from war to peace.
The Secretary-General underlined and amplified the recommendation. He asked for a new intergovernmental Peace-Building Commission as well as a Peace-Building Support Office within the Secretariat.
The Commission would have the capacity to coordinate all the relevant
players, both within the broad institutional structure of the United
Nations—across economic and security institutions—and with outside
institutions. It would fill the “gaping hole” in the institutional capacity
of the U.N. to address the transition from war to peace.
The Commission would serve as the focal point for expertise and
provide money and strategic guidance for recovery work, reconstruction, and institution building in fragile states. In the immediate aftermath of war, it would help to ensure predictable financing for the
recovery of national institutions; review and coordinate funding mechanisms, programs and agencies; provide a forum for sharing information about post-conflict recovery strategies; review progress; and,
especially important, extend the period of political attention to postconflict recovery. The Secretary-General asked for new institutional
machinery to focus and sustain attention on post-conflict recovery, one
of the difficult challenges that the United Nations has faced in the last
two decades.
The Peace-Building Commission is one of the most significant outcomes of the World Summit. Here the Summit displayed some creativity: it created the Commission and enabled subsequent negotiations
to highlight some of the contentious issues of composition and report-
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ing. After several months of negotiations, the Security Council and
the General Assembly adopted joint resolutions on 20 December 2005,
establishing the Peace-Building Commission. Permanent members of
the Commission are drawn from the Security Council (7), ECOSOC
(7), top financial contributors (5), top troop contributors (5), and the
General Assembly (5). The Commission would report annually to the
General Assembly and to the international financial institutions. It is
led by an Assistant Secretary-General, Carolyn McAskie from Canada,
who is in charge of the Peace-Building Support Office within the U.N.
Secretariat. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) will
administer a multi-year standing Peace-Building Fund to support postconflict stabilization and capacity building.
The Commission will, of course, have to demonstrate its usefulness and effectiveness over the long trajectory of post-conflict recovery. Much of what shapes recovery is clearly beyond its control, yet it
does have the capacity to coordinate across institutional jurisdictions,
to identify anomalies that can exist among the strategies of different
kinds of institutions, to share best practices, to work together with
state and non-governmental organizations, and to draw attention to
the need for ongoing support, especially after political attention has
shifted elsewhere. In all these ways, the Commission reflects the environment in which the United Nations now operates: a dense web of
international, state, and non-governmental organizations that all bring
resources into the field, pursuing short- and long-term strategies in
ways that can contradict one another.
VIII. Freedom to Live in Dignity
Nowhere has the imperative for reform been more apparent than in
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The Commission
was widely regarded as dysfunctional. “The Commission’s capacity to
perform its tasks,” the Secretary-General concluded, “has been increasingly undermined by its declining credibility and professionalism… . a
credibility deficit has developed, which casts a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole.”30 The active presence
of some of the most egregious violators of human rights, Libya and
Sudan, made a mockery of human rights norms. To make matters
worse, as Kofi Annan acknowledged, these states were able to use
Commission procedures to prevent any investigation and reporting
of their practices. In an era when protection of human rights is widely
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recognized as a fundamental obligation of states, when an emergent
concept of sovereignty focuses on the obligations of states to protect
the rights of its citizens, and when concepts of human security are
beginning to inform the understanding and practice of collective security, nothing discredited the United Nations more than the practices of
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.
In its early days, the Commission on Human Rights made a significant contribution to international law. It passed the seminal Universal
Declaration on Human Rights in 1948, followed by two International
Covenants and several human rights treaties. In subsequent years,
however, the Commission became increasingly ineffective in its work,
partly because of its procedures for membership selection, particularly
because of its working practices, and partly because of its accountability. The Commission was created by the Economic and Social Council
of the United Nations (ECOSOC) in 1946 to examine, monitor, and
report on human rights issues and human rights violations worldwide. It was subsidiary to ECOSOC, and its 53 members were elected
by regional groupings. There were no qualifications whatsoever for
membership aside from being selected by a regional group. It is this
procedure for membership selection that allowed egregious violators
of human rights to become members of the Commission. Six of the 53
member countries, for example, were ranked as among the “worst of
the worst” abusers of human rights by Freedom House.31
The Secretary-General asked the World Summit to abolish the Commission and replace it with a standing Human Rights Council. He left
open whether the Council should be a principal organ of the U.N. or
a subsidiary of the General Assembly. In either case, he recommended
that its members be elected directly by the General Assembly by a twothirds majority of members present and voting. This kind of procedure
would break the hold of regional groupings on the selection of members.32 In part because this recommendation went against the longestablished tradition of regional voting, the World Summit said little
about the Human Rights Council other than to endorse its creation.33
It then asked the President of the General Assembly to pursue negotiations to establish the mandate, functions, size, composition, membership, working methods, and procedures of the Council.
In March of 2006, the General Assembly passed a resolution creating the new Human Rights Council. The negotiations produced less
than a wholly satisfactory outcome. The Council became a subsidiary
organ of the General Assembly rather than an independent Council
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within the United Nations. Its size was reduced only minimally, from
53 to 47 members. The most disappointing outcome is its composition:
regional blocs are given a specified number of seats and they are not required
to nominate more countries than blocs so that General Assembly members
could vote against a particularly unqualified candidate. Nor are countries
currently under sanction by the United Nations barred from standing
for membership. Finally, members are elected by a simple majority of
those present and voting in the General Assembly, making it easier for
a state with a questionable human rights record to get elected. Clearly,
the safeguards built in to improve the quality of the membership on
the Council are weak.
There were a few encouraging signs as the first members of the new
Council were elected and held their first meeting in June 2006. The
Commission’s members were selected behind closed doors and then
usually elected by acclamation. Many members of the new Council
had to compete for seats and all needed the support of a majority
of all member states in a secret ballot. Algeria, China, Cuba, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, prominent on lists of rights abusers, are again
members of the new Council, but Iran was not. Some members of the
Commission—Sudan, Libya, Zimbabwe—were discouraged from running. This procedure clearly is an improvement, even if a modest one,
over its predecessor. More important, candidate members made voluntary commitments to promote and uphold human rights, and will
be expected to meet them or face possible suspension from the Council.34 Council members will be the first to undergo the periodic annual
review of their human rights record. Here, norm setting appears to
define the boundaries of membership.
The Council has also established a new universal review mechanism, which will periodically review the human rights records of all
192 member states of the United Nations. It will meet at least three
times a year, for a minimum of ten weeks per year (unlike the Commission, which met only for six weeks every spring). Early work in the
preparation of the Council has emphasized the importance of preventive initiatives to defuse simmering crises. The Council will have an
improved mechanism for meeting to deal with urgent human rights
crises in real time.35
Much will depend on how the new Council interprets its mandate
and enforces its standards, beginning with its own members. Centrally
important will be how the Council exercises its reporting function
and the role the Council gives to non-governmental organizations.
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At its first meeting, the Council replicated a longstanding pattern of
the Commission and condemned only Israel as a violator of human
rights. If states with poor human rights records continue to be elected
and serve, without review and without suspension, the Council will
quickly lose legitimacy and credibility, as did its predecessor. Bloc
voting continues to dominate and the record of the first six months is
not at all encouraging. If the record remains as disappointing as it is
currently, states and non-governmental organizations will look outside
the U.N. as they seek to move the human rights agenda forward. The
United Nations will fade into irrelevance when human rights are on
the table.
IX. Managing the United Nations
Only a week before the opening of the World Summit, the Volcker
Commission published a damning report on the corruption that had
infected the U.N.’s Oil-for-Food program in Iraq. The program was
begun in the mid-1990s to supervise Iraq’s sale of oil and use of the
funds to buy food, medicine, and other goods and services necessary
for the civilian population. A final report, published in October 2005,
found that more than 2,000 companies from sixty countries had paid
kickbacks to Saddam Hussein’s government. The program was jointly
run by the Security Council and the U.N. Secretariat, but the report
criticized senior staff at the U.N. for its failure to identify and stop the
corruption. The report stung. From the top down, something had gone
terribly awry in U.N. management.
The failure to manage the Oil-for-Food program appropriately
and the charge that U.N. peacekeeping forces sexually exploited local
women and children are troubling. They are disturbing for two quite
different reasons. They demonstrate serious failures of discipline,
financial control, and accountability on the part of U.N. staff and management. Both these failures go directly to the heart of the U.N. peace
and security agenda. A capacity to manage a program of sanctions is
critical in a world organization that seeks effective alternatives to war.
Insuring discipline among peacekeepers is a critical requirement for
a U.N. that is expanding its role in peacekeeping and peace building.
Neither of these are trivial failures at the margin of the organization.
The Secretary-General made the unglamorous subject of improved
management one of the top priorities of U.N. reform. The timing could
not have been worse.
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Some of the reforms that are necessary were obvious. The Volcker
Commission pointed to the confusion of responsibility between the
Security Council and the Secretariat as a principal cause of the dilution of the authority of the Secretariat and the evasion of responsibility. It was nevertheless clear that significant change was necessary in
the operating structures of the Secretariat. The Secretary-General had
a deputy secretary-general, with whom he shared responsibility for
management, but he had no chief operating officer who had the kinds
of responsibilities—and accountability—that most large organizations
find necessary. It is the Fifth Committee, a committee of the whole,
which currently has overall responsibility for management. In other
words, 192 member states formally supervise senior management.
The outcome document of the World Summit identified a set of
broad priorities to guide reform. It recommended the creation of an
ethics office and enactment of rules to protect “whistleblowers” who
come forward within the organization. It asked that policies of financial disclosure and conflict of interest be reviewed and upgraded; that
the Office of Internal Oversight Services, which performs an auditlike function, be strengthened on an urgent basis; and that the Secretary-General submit an independent external review of performance
within the United Nations and within the specialized agencies. It also
requested that the General Assembly create an independent oversight
advisory committee. Finally, it asked that all mandates older than five
years be reviewed. There are literally thousands of these mandates still
on U.N. books.
Much of what the World Summit asked for is routine in large organizations and would significantly improve performance. Nevertheless, at
the United Nations, these instructions had bite. They touched directly
on sharp disagreements between the Group of 77 and developed states
about the direction and importance of secretariat reform, in particular,
and a review of mandates more generally. The G-77 countries worried
that they would lose their political control to the Security Council and
the Secretary-General if some of these recommendations were implemented. The high-profile engagement of the U.S. Ambassador to the
U.N. on the issues of both management and mandates provoked hostility rather than support. Not only did these recommendations bite,
they also stung.
To jump-start the reform process, Ambassadors Allan Rock of Canada and Munir Akram of Pakistan were asked to co-chair a committee
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charged with management reform. Their agenda looked much like that
identified by the World Summit:
• To improve the management of human resources to promote a
merit-based system of recruitment and retention.
• To reform budget processes through improvement in accounting,
auditing, and external oversight to meet international standards.
• To review the mandates, rules, and regulations of the U.N., as part
of a broader examination of the relevance and effectiveness of the
work of the U.N.
I look at each of these in turn. The management of human resources,
the first of the three big planks of management reform, is central to the
functioning of the U.N. The Office of the Secretary-General has no discretion in the hiring of senior officials, there is no chief operating officer
tasked with overseeing day-to-day administration, and management
systems and financial systems have not kept pace with other public
institutions. The Secretary-General made specific proposals for change
in six areas: people, leadership, information and communications technology, delivery of services, budget and finance, and governance.36
He proposed increasing his authority and discretion to reallocate jobs
and money without approval from the budgeting committee; professionalizing recruitment and training practices; outsourcing abroad
costly services that are now provided by its New York headquarters;
regrouping and clustering by function twenty-five departments that
now report directly to the Secretary-General; and delegating authority
for management policies and overall operational matters to the Deputy
Secretary-General. The Secretary-General was trying to reduce ineffective, cumbersome, and at times archaic management by the General
Assembly.
A firestorm erupted. G-77 countries interpreted these reforms as a
dilution of their already limited authority within the General Assembly and a transfer of power to the Security Council, particularly its permanent members. Kofi Annan withdrew two of the most controversial
proposals redistributing authority from the General Assembly to the
Secretary-General on budgeting. Nevertheless, the Budget Committee,
which usually works by consensus, voted 108 to 50 in favor of a resolution offered by South Africa in the name of the Group of 77 and China.
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The resolution rejected or delayed most of the management reforms
that had been submitted to the committee. Dumisano Kumalo of South
Africa, the leader of the Group of 77, complained that the reform proposals transferred authority from the General Assembly to the Security
Council and the Office of the Secretary-General, in which Northern
countries are far more influential. The Secretary-General lost a crucial
round in the battle to move management procedures within the U.N.
closer to international standards.37 It is possible that some of these proposals will re-emerge during the honeymoon that the new SecretaryGeneral will enjoy in the first six months of 2007.
Much more progress has been made in the reform of the budget process. An ethics office has been created, new protection has been put in
place for whistleblowers, a panel of outside experts has been appointed
to support the internal oversight office at the United Nations, and an
external audit procedure has been instituted. All this has been accomplished in less than a year. Major challenges still remain, however,
in streamlining budget procedures and in introducing much-needed
flexibility in the capacity to transfer funds within existing budgetary
allocations.
The review of mandates is likely to be a much longer and less productive process. Just a few weeks after the Secretary-General delivered his report on management reform, he submitted his report on the
review of mandates to the General Assembly, along with an electronic
database of mandates that are over five years old.38 There are over
3,000 such mandates.
The selection of mandates for review is itself politically controversial, closely linked to the issue of Palestine. Alongside the review of
mandates, which is currently the object of consultations within the
General Assembly, a parallel review of rules and regulations looks
at the organizing rules of the central U.N. agencies. For example, is
it appropriate to vest the Fifth Committee with overall managerial
responsibility or to establish a Select Committee, with a representative
group of nations serving on a rotating basis? This kind of question,
too, is highly charged and currently blocked. The process of mandate
review is likely to be long and time consuming, with little or no shortterm or even medium-term outcomes.
The glacially slow process of management reform is discouraging
because it speaks to the lack of core competencies in the areas of peacekeeping, peace building, and security, and to the quality of staff the
United Nations can recruit and retain. The deep divisions within the

26

Janice Gross Stein

U.N. are predictable and understandable, even if they can be disabling
at times. Any “grand bargain,” which is designed to bridge these differences on development, security, and human rights, will depend on
an enhanced capacity of the U.N. to manage and deliver results. It is
discouraging that this Secretary-General was unable to bridge the gap
on management. The new Secretary-General will have a short window
at the beginning of his term. If no progress is made, the U.N. may well
become an increasingly disabled and marginalized institution, capable
of doing much less than its members need.
X. The United Nations as Global Metaphor
I asked in the introduction to this essay whether the U.N. is managing a global order that is structured and legitimate, or whether it is an
important part of restructuring a global system that is fragmented and
contested? The answer to this question, I argue, matters in creating reasonable expectations of what the U.N. can and cannot do. This review
of the challenges the Secretary-General faced in trying to reform the
U.N. provides a preliminary answer.
The structure and the legitimacy of the global “order” are both in
question. The global system is simultaneously fragmenting and reforming as new kinds of organizations—non-governmental with governments, private as well as public, international institutions alongside
states—are recognized and given official voice in the international
machinery. Not only are new kinds of organizations participating
actively in shaping the global order but some are organized in different ways. Both war and peace are being made by organizations joined
together as networks. They are characterized by flatter structures, with
decentralized structures of decision-making and built-in redundancy
so that they are better able to survive in challenging environments.
Networks of non-governmental organizations raise funds and orchestrate strategies of recovery in post-conflict societies. Al-Qaida and
Hizbollah, structured as distributed networks with decentralized capabilities, wage war against states. These networks are resilient, flexible,
and nimble, with a capacity to move information quickly, to deploy
sophisticated technologies, and to operate “close to the ground.”
In this complex and diverse ecology of a global order with multiple
species, and with new forms of organizations that play new roles,
the newly created Peace-Building Commission may well stand as a
metaphor for the broader United Nations. The Commission emerges, I
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argue, as one among many important nodes, but with unique capacities to serve as a clearinghouse for information and as a traffic coordinator in a crowded and noisy environment that is in the process of
reshaping itself. This description of the Commission may well be an
apt description of the United Nations in the decade ahead. It may be
apt because the global environment is not well structured or with clear
rules that are widely accepted. Rather, the U.N. is working in an environment that is simultaneously fragmenting and re-forming. Norms
are contested and the meanings of some of its most fundamental institutions, such as sovereignty, are in the process of redefinition.
What can we expect of the United Nations in this complex and
diverse ecology? Most of the answer we already see but some we do
not. We need a U.N. that is deeply embedded in a chain of connections
that functions as a central node in the network of global institutions.
More and more, this is what the U.N. is doing—in the Peace-Building
Commission, in the Global Compact that brings together corporate
leaders with non-governmental organizations under the auspices of
the U.N., and in the dialogue the Secretary-General sponsored among
world religions. The United Nations is the world’s convener, enabler,
and facilitator, and that is no small accomplishment.
To succeed as a central node in newly emergent global networks,
though, the U.N. will have to become more than a convener and
enabler. It will have to bring to the table a capacity to manage and to
manage well. Good management is boring, unglamorous, and pedestrian in comparison to other dramatic challenges the U.N. faces, but it
is a prerequisite for effective performance in all that it does. In network
language, the U.N. must be able to share information quickly and
effectively, and to move resources and people nimbly, with a minimum of bureaucratic consultation and delay. If it is slow, cumbersome,
and hobbled with consultations up and down the chain of command,
it becomes an unattractive partner for networks that are moving in
real time. If its staff becomes corruptible, the damage to its credibility, legitimacy, and effectiveness will be incalculable. Here, as I have
argued, the U.N. secretariat faces real challenges that its leadership,
through the Secretary-General, must meet. It is legitimate, in my view,
to hold the Secretary-General and his senior staff accountable for the
performance of those who are responsible for the management of the
United Nations.
Born in an age in which states were the only legitimate participants
in world politics, can the United Nations adapt to an ecology wherein
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states are joined by non-governmental organizations and global corporations, other international institutions (both public and private), and
militias, each networked together across borders? Can the U.N. adapt
to a world in which technology is revolutionizing the global movement
of information, warfare, disease, and production? If it is to become
more than merely a convenient place to stop and talk, it must be able to
deploy its resources with the same speed, flexibility, and effectiveness
as the best of the rest in its environment. This is the challenge for the
new Secretary-General. 
•
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